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This paper seeks to analyze the nature of legal communication.  It does so by examining 
the nature of paradox and its centrality to legal discourse.  Is the paradox something that 
legal theory must escape?  In this paper, we will argue that paradox is a central and 
defining feature of legal conceptuality; it simply pushes the boundaries of traditional 
rationality and makes a deeper a more probing analysis possible.  Contemporary legal 
theory, from Legal Realism to Critical Legal Studies, is slowly coming to recognize the 
importance of this notion.  This paper seeks to trace the route of legal paradox, as a figure 
of text and experience, through the writings of key figures such as Vico, Derrida, and 
Luhmann.  By doing so, it will be shown how paradox forms a lynchpin for all legal 




Paradox and Legal Theory 
 
 One of the most salient and pervasive features of modern legal thought has been the 
generalized recognition of the paradoxical formation and basis of legal knowledge and institutions.  
The pristine world of legal verities, if any such world ever existed, has evaporated like so many 
illusions unmasked by contemporary skepticism.  Some have described this contemporary and 
virulent form of skepticism as ‘postmodernism.’  Its principal features involve the unveiling of 
legal fictions and, most importantly, authority structures.  It will be the argument of this paper that 
these modern skepticisms, or, this ‘postmodernism’ is not a novel feature of current legal 
institutions only.  These skepticisms are rooted in a vastly integrated, centuries-long questioning of 
the foundations of law.  The purpose of the present chapter will be to situate these questions within 
a broader discourse of paradox.  Paradox is, in its ancient sense, something im-passable, a 
conundrum that makes movement forward or conclusiveness difficult if not impossible.  In order to 
engage the paradox, however, one must engage the argument.  Therefore, one is caught in an im-
passable argument and bound to the dictates of a language that we cannot often control (Sorensen 
2003: 6-7).  Now the paradox was a distinctive feature of Greek philosophy from Anaximander to 
Aristotle.  In this often hidden history of paradox within the otherwise coherent account of truth 
and its findings within the West, the figure of Zeno becomes important as the codifier of the un-
codifiable; in other words, he is able to set the tone and to speculate on the linear dynamics of 
paradox.  The eighteenth century Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico put himself into the 
very vortex of paradox and self-consciously constructs his philosophy in the manner of inter-
related and over-determined binaries.  All this talk of paradox and philosophy might seem far away 
from the concerns of ‘real world’ legalities but, in truth, they linger within the very body of law.  
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Law is paradoxically formed because it cannot happen otherwise.  Primary divisions and 
differences within the body of law create strange structurations that do not resolve themselves with 
the aid of reason or technique.  Vico’s lasting insight was to understand paradoxicality as a crucial 
impetus or, we might say, architectonic of legal knowledge and history.  In fact, it is the 
antinomical communication of paradox in its interiority that over-determines law.  Law is 
indeterminate because it is structured through differences that are at once mythically and 
conceptually tied.  This is the death waltz of the law, of its circularity, iterability and repetition.  It 
is never, therefore, a simple matter of choice between one side and the other but an intricate bi-
implication within a multiplicity of points of view.  As our analysis develops we will delve deeper 
into the nature of legal paradox and its ultimate irresolvability.  Paradox leads us to the im-passable 
yet it also brings us to the edge of possibility.  Is this possibility a pure form?  No, rather a 
possibility of immanence and of interiors designed to punch through the techniques of legal 
determination in which we are both inside and outside rationality. 
 Many important legal thinkers of the late nineteenth century began to ask questions about 
the prevailing orthodoxies of legal knowledge.  The formalistic techniques developed at Harvard 
influenced Anglo-American legal history in an important way.  What became known as 
Langdellianism advocated pure methods of stating a case and finding the source and point of law 
(Duxbury 1995).  This process was taught as a technique that could be applied in a universal sense.  
The argument was that the particular case might have been different but the method of significative 
extraction, of finding what was important in the matter at hand, was formal and universal.  One 
could, in other words, find the universality within the particularity.  It must be clear that this 
discovery of legal principle was not seen as an intuitive exercise but as a mode of exculpation 
modeled on the successful discovery of raw data or facts within the natural sciences.  Cases were 
codified and organized, as reading material for law schools, and students were called upon to recite 
and indicate the principle involved.  Reduction and abstraction not interpretation were the 
guideposts of this understanding of legal knowledge.  Students, it was believed, could be trained in 
this technique without much strain and enter the practical legal world with tools of extraction, 
reduction, and abstraction that would allow them to cut to the chase within the context of any 
particular case.  In the late nineteenth century, especially in the United States, questions arose, as 
we mentioned earlier, as to the validity and applicability of this model.  Great jurists and legal 
theorists such as Holmes and Cardozo pointed out the inherent unpredictability of the juridical 
decision (Holmes 1992).  Could Langdellian formalism explain the nature of judicial review?  
Judges and lawyers trained in the formalism of legal certainty and technique were spread all over 
North America and its methods were even being applied across the Atlantic in Britain yet different 
judges still were deciding different cases in different ways.  They grounded their claims, it is true, 
in points of law, precedent or statute but they also looked to morality to base their decisions.  And 
even if some of them, such as Holmes, looked to science as their model their variant interpretations 
of evolutionary theory or animal behaviour resulted in diverse outcomes.  As a result, legal 
certainty had reached something of a dead end both within the academy and without.  No doubt this 
type of legal formalism survives even to this day both in theory and in practice.  However it cannot 
be grasped outside the context of its questioning.  The questioning of pure form and technique has 
largely been bequeathed to contemporary legal thought through the important Legal Realist 
movement.  These thinkers sought to use the methods of the emerging social sciences to jolt law 
away from its over-reliance on insular modes of reasoning towards an openness to alternate forms 
of explanation (Duxbury 1995).  This was conceived essentially as a strategy to wipe away the 
cobwebs inhabiting the legal mind and replace them with incisive social theory.  Much of this 
movement culminated, one could argue, in the work of Jerome Frank.  Frank combined 
psychoanalysis, psychology, and sociology into a sustained critique of legal mythologies which he 
saw to be a product of an infantile mind.  By doing so, he went to the heart of the problematic that I 
have identified. 
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 Frank’s language often cuts like a knife.  He is able to draw clear demarcations and 
delineate issues with an enviable precision.  Frank describes the current decrepit state of legal self-
deception in the following manner 
 
The lawyer’s pretenses are not consciously deceptive.  The lawyers, themselves, like the 
laymen, fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic and mutable character of law.  
Although it is the chiefest function of lawyers to make the legal rules viable and pliable, a 
large part of the profession believes, and therefore encourages the laity to believe, that 
those rules either are or can be made essentially immutable. (Frank 1931: 9) 
 
He further goes on to ridicule those legal professionals who speak of finding a rule as a process 
akin to geometry or mathematics.  To see law as a rigid code of applicable rules is both untrue and 
practically misleading 
 
Now the true art of the lawyer is the art of legal modification, an art highly useful to the 
layman.  For the layman’s interests, although he does not realize it, would be poorly 
served by an immobile system of law.  Especially is this so in the twentieth century.  The 
emphasis of our era is on change.  The present trend in law is, accordingly, away from 
static security—the preservation of old established rights—and towards dynamic 
security—the protection of men engaged in new enterprises.  Which means that the 
layman’s ordinary practical needs would be seriously thwarted by an inelastic legal 
arrangement.  A body of undeviating legal principles he would find unbearably 
procrustean.  Yet paradoxically he and his lawyers, when they express their notions of a 
desirable legal system, usually state that they want the law to be everlastingly settled. 
(Frank 1931: 10) 
 
This collection of misperceptions and misunderstandings are the groundwork of what Frank call the 
“basic myth.”  This myth is most clearly expressed in the longing for certainty and in the desire to 
eliminate the capriciousness of particularity with the stability of rules and unchangeability.  For 
Frank this myth arises because of the ingrained infantilism of a culture that, since ancient times, 
has relied on unknowable certainties fixed in the sky or in the mind.  To understand the mind of the 
child and its imaginative construction of the world is to understand the very nature of legal 
formalism and its fetishism of rules.  Order is psychologically preferable to chaos.  Yet this 
preference can easily slide into destructive modes of legal formation that are completely out of 
touch with the modern world. 
 Why this text?  I have embarked on a partial reading of one of Legal Realism’s greatest 
thinkers to prove the point that a growing recognition of paradox in law and of the limits of 
certainty, at least of a scientific type, in the legal system.  This text is also important because of its 
gifts of posterity, to a legal theory that would come after the final days of Legal Realism.  The re-
constituted program of legal positivism recognized this dilemma as well as Natural Law theory.  
Most importantly when ‘critical theory’, per se, is brought to law the question of the legal paradox 
is re-framed and cast in terms of the antinomies or contradictions indicative of a liberal model of 
law.  Exponents of Critical Legal Studies begin from the Marxist insight of inherent contradiction 
that expands outward from the central locales of politics and economics.  Unger, for example, 
speaks at length of the antinomies of liberal thought, such as fact and theory, self and collectivity, 
and individualism and altruism (Unger 1975).  The problem that we, as well as others, identify with 
the CLS School is its over reliance on simple inversions as solutions.  In other words, altruism is to 
replace individualism as a pertinent example.  However, such solutions beg the question and seek a 
new form of rigidity in which the rule of individualism is replaced with the rule of collectivity.  In 
fact, paradox in law cannot be overcome in such a facile and banal manner.  Paradox is 
disseminated throughout the body of law and it will re-emerge whenever we believe that we have 
eliminated only one ugly side of the riddle.  
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Nature/Culture and Legal Communication 
 
 If Vico’s understanding of law is premised around certain dualisms that over-determine 
legal institutions, what are its forms?  And, further, how does it express itself in content.  These are 
questions that are at the very center of Vico’s metaphysical ruminations and lay the necessary 
groundwork for a new concept of historico-social science.  As I will show throughout this study, 
the true nature of this founding moment of social science can only be understand by taking Vico’s 
idea of conatus as an interpretive nexus.  All conditions and determinations as well as freedoms 
and expressions must pass through the hermeneutic hinge of conatus.  In one sense conatus is 
simply understood and expressed as the ‘will to will’; more specifically, it becomes an ontological 
category that tries to deal with the contradictions of motion and rest.  In his early metaphysical 
writings, as they are summarized in The Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, Vico meditates on the 
intricate structural and physical nature of motion.  To move from motion to rest is a simple paradox 
that is shown through a reading of Zeno of Elea.  We clearly have abstract and mundane concepts 
that can account for motion and rest; however, how do we explain, in similar terms, the process 
that brings us from rest to motion?  After the publication of The Ancient Wisdom, Vico drops the 
idea of a metaphysics coordinated in a systematic fashion and turns towards the contemplation of 
things historical.  He is brought to the historical world by his academic interest in law.  Yet, I will 
argue, he does not leave behind his metaphysical conclusions exemplified in the problematic of 
conatus.  In his historical analyses conatus will re-emerge at crucial points as a hinge between past 
and present, rest and motion; it marks a transition point, a demarcation; in sum, a difference 
ontologically drawn.  In social and historical terms, conatus is an idea that Vico uses to expresses 
this different-iating process.  There is no greater differentiation than that drawn by humans as they 
escape the confines of nature.  Nature, on one side, and culture, on the other, are inextricably bound 
in a dualism that is self-produced.  This dualistic understanding of Vico’s thought is acknowledged 
by Enzo Paci in Ingens Sylvae as the cornerstone for any understanding of Vico that seeks to go 
beyond its proclamations and redactions at the hands of interpreters to its profound interior (Paci 
1994).  Much of what we will argue will be premised on this Pacian insight.  In fact, we believe 
that a thorough and open reading of Vico’s text make it necessary. 
What is the significance of the divide between nature and culture?  I could begin with some 
simple clichés about the movement from a natural context to one created by and for humans.  
However, the difference that we are discussing is literally the difference that makes a difference.  
Humans are at first bestial.  In itself this claims nothing unusual.  But if humans are at first 
‘animalistic’ in their proclivities and habits then that means that culture is the work of taming.  
Culture tames, first and foremost, the passions.  Therefore, conatus is the work of culture; it 
embodies the attempt to overcome bestiality and to forge human institutions.  The ultimate 
significance of conatus lies in its ability of conversion.  It is able to draw the necessary 
demarcations that make civilization, at any level, possible.  Passions must be tamed in order to 
form families and states and these passions are not abstract or detached from the existentiality of 
our lives.  They are embedded deep within our psyche.  As a result, humanity’s taming and the 
laying of the various earthworks required for culture are a simultaneous and enduring task that 
requires interior self-mastery.  Self-mastery is in conjunction with any type of social formation; self 
and society are mutually implicated in a continuous process of civilization.  Humans must gain 
self-mastery in order to stave off the destructive tendencies of their fallen nature.  God, in turning 
humans away from the Garden of Eden, has reduced humanity to a state of constant agitation.  
These agitations are expressed as internal movements in which force or power is pitted against 
contrary forces and powers.  This is where we can detect the Spinozist influence working its way 
into Vico’s corpus.  No doubt the idea, found in Spinoza’s Ethics, that passions must be controlled 
and that the human soul needs to acquire an internal balance is related to the basic dialogue of 
Vico’s conatus.  The language and structure are largely altered but the ethico-ontological insight 
gained by the discourse of self-mastery is retained in large measure.  For Vico, it expresses the 
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deep linkages between mind and social structure.  Further, the Spinozist discourse of ethical self-
mastery means, for Vico, that culture and civilization are products of self-creation.  Humans make 
their societies by taming their own selfish desires and destructive appetites; self-mastery is 
equivalent to social formation.  This ability to create culture at both ends of the conceptual 
spectrum means that any discussion of one end presupposes or ‘calls out’ the necessity of an 
explanation that can account for the other as well.  From an ethico-political perspective this idea is 
most important in its implications for our understanding of “freedom.”  For Vico, as for Spinoza 
before him, freedom will not become simply a negative or liberal notion, a form without content.  It 
is understood as the act of self-creation imbued and co-implicated along with social formation.  
These understandings clearly give a new significance to law and expand the range of human 
activity that it covers.  Law is not only, or even primarily, the ability to forge and form coercive 
social structures and obedient populations.  It is also an interior process of social and psychic 
construction. 
 Roberto Unger in his magisterial work called Politics describes the rise of modern social 
theory as a reaction to naturalistic accounts of the cultural world.  It lays the groundwork for a 
modern type of social theory and it is with Vico that, according to Unger, this anti-naturalistic 
claim is staked 
 
Much in our modern ideas about society represents the relentless development of the 
principle contained in Vico’s statement than man can understand the social world because 
he made it. (Unger 2004:84) 
 
As I have demonstrated, this anti-naturalism is not premised on the claim that nature has no 
influence on human conduct or that we live in an ideal solipsism of our own making.  Nature is 
humanity’s constant companion and, as such, lies beyond moral evaluation.  However, the paradox 
emerges in recognizing this while simultaneously imposing a moral or ethical context that calls into 
question the activities and lifestyles that emerge from nature.  As humans we must constantly 
check our desires and we must learn to channel them into socially acceptable avenues.  Societies 
must also learn this art of self-mastery.  In Luhmannian terms, society draws its boundary through 
the difference between the social system and its environment.  This difference survives, 
systematically and psychically, through the activities and communications of institutions and 
individuals.  For Luhmann and modern systems theory, communications are the basis for social 
formation.  In abstract terms this occurs through various processes of self-observation; it is, in other 
words, about the system observing itself.  By doing so, the system is able to differentiate itself and 
obtain independence or autopoiesis (Luhmann 1984: 137-175).  The ability of systems to do this 
means that consciousness is able to draw the distinction of ego and alter.  Therefore, although 
social systems and psychic systems are separated and independent, they are structurally coupled; in 
other words, they translate meanings between levels.  Reflexivity and self-mastery are connected 
and given life through the actions and/or communications of autonomous systems.  What makes all 
this interpenetrating of communication and consciousness possible is the work and task of 
language: “Only language secures reflexivity” (Luhmann 1984: 153); language, in other words, is 
able to meaningfully form the difference between nature and culture.  In Vichian terms, I will be 
describing this as the process of ingenium.  Ingenium is the ability to move our passions via the 
vehicle of language.  Here we are not talking of conceptual or scientific language that might 
describe our world as a plane of objects but of the poetic word.  Poetry is able to do two essential 
things for Vico.  First, it orders and makes sense of the world.  It explains, for example, why the 
thunder bellows, why lightning strikes, what the meaning of death is, as well as all other things.  It 
connects humanity to the world around.  Second, it tames through its models and examples.  It does 
so by giving us concrete examples of heroic or godly behavior as well as explicating the wishes of 
the gods.  These gods seek to be propriated and it is the task of poetic divination to discover divine 
desire.  The body as a communicative site of meaning plays a major part in this process (O’Neill 
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1989).  Upon the body are inscriptions of poetic ordering that once again speak to the connection I 
have made between Vico’s levels of analysis.  This insight is largely based on recognizing the role 
of human nature in the formation of language.  Humanity does not have an abstract point of view 
from which to judge nature and so must rely on what can be learned from resemblance.  
Resemblance becomes the source of metaphor because it is a property of the human mind “that 
whenever men can form no idea of distant and unknown things, they judge them by what is 
familiar and at hand” (1994:60).  Therefore, the body becomes a central repository of meaning 
since: “words are carried over from bodies and from the properties of bodies to signify the 
institutions of mind and spirit” (1994: 78).  Passions are controlled along the contours of bodies 
themselves by speaking, in a metaphoric sense, the language of corporeality.  Languages were 
formed through song and became a major source for the control of passions and the formation of 
culture; “men vent great passions by breaking into song” (1994: 77).   
 Poetry is the first source of law.  This is something that Vico repeats incessantly.  The basis 
for his argument is found in the idea that culture must be understood through its origins 
 
The nature of institutions is nothing but their coming into being (nascimento) at certain 
times and in certain guises.  Whenever the time and guise are thus and so, such and not 
otherwise are the institutions that come into being. (1994:64)  
 
I have chosen to describe this principle as Vico’s hermeneutics of beginnings.  It is an interpretive 
idea that seeks to bind beginnings to posterity.  For Vico, this is not expressive of an antiquarian 
eroticism.  In truth, it reflects the importance of original formation to the life of society because: 
“The inseparable properties of institutions must be due to the modification or guise with which they 
are born” (1994: 64).  A society’s origin, as well as all the institutions such as the law that we 
chose to observe, leave indelible traces on all present and future formations.  Poetry, in its dual 
function as conceptual and institutional, is this indelible trace at the origin of society.  Poetic 
language is described as the great witness to the “customs of the early days of the world” 
(1994:65).  It is here in the beginnings of poetic language, which is after all the first language, that 
we can seek to understand the nature of law as a social institution.  Poetic language is an archive of 
authoritative social formation; it is, in other words, a redactor of archaic law.  The poems of Homer 
become significant historical repositories of legal theorizing; it is the first place where law 
develops as an active form of self-observation.  Vico saw Homer as a historical archive of great 
worth long before modern attempts to prove his cultural veracity: “the poems of Homer are civil 
histories of ancient Greek customs” as well as “two great treasure houses of the natural law of the 
gentes of Greece” (1994:65).  Homer is the exemplar of a historical process in which poetry, 
language, and law are intertwined in a delicate mix of social formation.  Homer and the other poets 
describe things sensually with the body as the prime site of metaphor.  Metaphor, for Vico, 
expresses this insensate sensuality by talking of things and experiences beyond or outside the body 
within terms understood through the same body.  This becomes a type of body thinking.  Therefore, 
if the poets say that “the fields are thirsty” (1994:129) we understand the connection or linkage 
because of our existential and corporeal experience; it is, in reality, a metaphor that all, especially 
those who remain close to the land, can understand.  These body-metaphors resonate with an 
“eternal property” which is described as a “credible impossibility” (1994:120).  In other words, 
they make connections of difference within the sameness of perception; the human mind takes the 
impossible for reality at least at the level of belief because she can point to her embodiment.  
Eventually, in the progression of language from its feral origins, fables or fabula develop.  Fabula 
is equivalent to the Greek idea of mythos and represents a collection or re-collection of significant 
metaphors organized as narratives.  Various extensions of metaphor such as metonymy and 
synecdoche are invoked in the fable as extensions of language.  The end result of the process is a 
narrative which constructs enduring poetic characters that always represent more then there name.  
In fact, their name becomes synonymous with certain ideas.  These poetic characters lay the basis 
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for humankind’s first form of abstract thinking which Vico describes as vulgar metaphysics.  
Orpheus, for example, is a tamer of men’s passions; he tames with his lyre and soothes the 
bestiality of humans.  This type of figure is not an individual; she or he is an active representation 
of a series of interconnected ideas and values.  Orpheus, along with Hercules, Solon, Romulus, 
Numa Pompilius, and Cadmus, was a nomothetoi or law-giver.  They are exemplars of civility and 
tame internal passions and limit unrest through language, in the case of Orpheus, or power and 
strength, in the case of Hercules.  The strongman and the poet become conspirators in the creation 
of culture.   
 In sum, I am claiming, with Vico, that the law can be read off of the historical contours laid 
down for us by history.  The above descriptions of the earliest forms of metaphor rely on 
understandings of language development.  The age of gods is one of hieroglyphic communication.  
Here the gods speak to human through the artifice of a written language which is, in a strong sense, 
ideographic.  This is what Vico is referring to when he says that: “all nations began to speak by 
writing” since the “first nations thought in poetic characters, spoke in fables, and wrote in 
hieroglyphics” (1994: 138).  Writing precedes speech because of the inscription of bodily forms on 
a misunderstood universe; the universe is the body writ large and ideograms become bodies of 
expression.  Symbolic or heroic language turns to the deeds of men who are born or generated from 
the gods.  Their language is therefore edifying yet now tied to a certain humanity in its presence; it 
shows us more of the actions of men while the gods become ultimate arbiters slightly removed 
from the game.  The heroes of culture, mentioned above, fit this category and role best.  Lastly, 
epistolary language is a fully humanized type which is based on distant communication and factual 
justification.  Because “law is born from language” (1994: 159) it will certainly be borne out that it 
follows similar strains of development.  Law is at first theocratic-theological or themis.  Divine 
design and cosmic balance are the basis of law.  Law is then heroic or aristocratic and is grounded 
on power, authority, and wisdom of the ruling classes.  Lastly, law is grounded in popular forms of 
sovereignty and philosophical analysis.  These languages all have their own forms of 
differentiation.  The theocratic moment is grounded in a difference of human from her universe and 
God; the heroic is based in an inimical relationship of classes; and the popular form of government 
is justified as a difference of all amongst all or aequitas. Further, all of these developments assume, 
along with Luhmann, that law entails a growing awareness of itself; in other words, self-reference 
or reflexivity increases in epochs bound by epistolary language.  Irony, for example, requires an 
awareness of inside and outside as well as truth and falsity: “Irony…is fashioned of falsehood by 
dint of a reflection which wears the mask of truth” (1994:130).  The full explication of the 
significance of my argument will require patience on the part of the reader.  In fact, most of my 
work in this study will be grounded on trying to elaborate some of the simple premises that I have 
put forward here.  Once an author pulls on a particular strand in the work of a great thinker, many 
more issues appear and the complexity grows. 
 
The Mysterious Origins of Legal Authority 
 
The paradox of legal self-reference points indeed at the larger and bothersome problem of 
legal authority.  From a legal internal perspective, law is a closed self-referring system.  
Nevertheless, from an external point of view, the justification for obeying the authority of 
the legal order must emanate, in the last resort, from a transcendent—extra legal—source.  
The rule of law is always the rule of man.  Law does not amend or justify itself; it is 
people who amend or justify their laws.  From an extra-legal perspective, the authority of 
law stems from a prelegal origin that antecedes the legal authority and is not bound by it.  
Yet, the one thing which the law can never justify by itself is its prelegal (and therefore, 
non-legal) origins.  The legal order cannot justify the prelegal roots of its authority. 
(Kedar 2006: 102) 
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This quote from a recent text that deals with the whole issue of paradox and inconsistency in law 
reveals much of the problematic of authority.  Its origins remain mysterious in the sense that we 
cannot grasp its founding moment nor, as a result, can we hope to justify its conservation.  Kedar 
talks of “prelegal” justifications of law that recede into the darkness as we seek to approach.  I 
agree with the general sentiment of paradox imminent to this whole question of authority.  Further, 
the more elaborate arguments for the centrality of paradox to legal knowledge is premised on the 
idea that this is an im-passable nexus; it is one that both impedes our progress and calls us to 
continual re-evaluation.  Why is this question important to legal knowledge?  Why should we be 
concerned with its implications?  In sum, I would say that this area of analysis opens up the chasm 
of law to the questions that are most important in the existential practice of law.  It raises the 
question of the important role of violence and its reduction in legal formation; violence, after all, is 
“prelegal” because it can impose rules without justification.  But is violence an albatross forever 
bound the neck of law?  Does physical or bodily violence become conceptual or abstract violence?  
This brings us to some of the arguments I raised above in reference to the centrality of conatus for 
Vico.  One may also ask about the significance of theological-theocratic formation to law.  In other 
words, can law be founded (and conserved) without the reference to a wholly other (God)?  I will 
answer these questions not in the form of schema but through an interpretive encounter with 
Derrida.  In two crucial texts, written years apart but imbued with the same spirit, Derrida raises 
these very same questions.  His analysis will be useful to my analysis because of its radicality.  In 
other words, Derrida pushes these questions to their philosophical, logical, and social extremes.  
Without such a strategy, one that exposes us to the risk of skepticism, indeterminacy, and possibly 
nihilism, I do not believe that we can come to an adequate understanding of law.   
 The text known as Violence and Metaphysics was written sometime in 1967 and lays out 
an in-depth encounter with the work of Emanuel Levinas.  Levinas became known in France for his 
‘thinking of the other.’  This involved a suspension of traditional philosophical categories grounded 
in regions such as epistemology and ontology for the sake of ‘ethics as first philosophy.’  What is 
at stake for Derrida is the radicality of Levinas’ thought.  Did the thought of the ‘other’ make 
possible a non-violence bound within the very origins of the world’s opening?  La trace de l’autre 
lies beyond any horizon, in a phenomenological sense (Derrida 1978: 95).  The other is both the 
human face and its ethical call as well as the wholly Other (God).  Ethics can be grounded in an 
epistemological analysis and self-awareness of the critical variety as one would find in Kant’s 
categorical imperative.  Nor can fundamental ontology, as in Heidegger, seek primordial grounds.  
Ethics is the first relation of human to her world and cannot be superseded   
 
the only possible ethical imperative, the only incarnated nonviolence in that it is respect 
for the other.  An immediate respect for the other himself…because it does not pass 
through the neutral element of the universal, and through respect—in the Kantian sense—
for the law.  (Derrida 1978: 96)   
 
This indicates the interconnection, especially in the eyes of Levinas, between the task of nonviolent 
foundation and the law.  It seems that the law is stained with the negativity of violence because it 
conceptualizes a universal or abstract element.  Yet by doing so the immediacy as well 
transcendent value of the other disappears.  There are many intricacies to Derrida’s text that I 
cannot elaborate on here.  But the main point that I am seeking to make is that there is a separation 
drawn between violence, its forms and what makes it possible, and nonviolence.  Nonviolence is 
non-form, non-conceptuality; it is religion, in its purest expression, versus philosophy and politics; 
it is, in sum, the Jew versus the Greek.  The question that Derrida is left with by the end of this 
lengthy analysis is: “Are we Jews?  Are we Greeks?” (Derrida 1978: 153).  In other words, can 
violence be attributed to a particular tradition such as Greek politics and metaphysics?  Can we 
incise one from the other?  And, most importantly, can our surgery remove nonviolence from the 
active and vibrant body of violence?  In the case of Levinas, he would ask whether the Jew could 
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be removed from the Greek in order to found a pure religiosity.  Derrida’s answer to this is both 
simple and revealing: “We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek, which is perhaps 
the unity of what is called history.  We live in and of difference, that is, in hypocrisy...” (Derrida 
1978: 153).  This concern with violence and its paradoxical origins will carry over into Derrida’s 
explicit analysis of law and the problem of authority that he will embark upon years after this 
Levinas piece.  However, the two texts of Violence and Metaphysics and the Force of Law 
represent something of an arch.  They will both ask the same essential questions of violence, 
authority and law and they will also employ the same paradoxes to rattle the foundations of legal 
rule. 
The aporias of legal rule are laid out in terms of a problematic of violence.  This is not a 
new interpretive invention but a radicalization of traditional dilemmas about the role of force in 
legal justification.  Vico, like Derrida, connects violence with the very core of law and his theory of 
conatus is like a historical process of conversion.  Violence, and the coercive force of law, are 
implicated as progenitors of justice; force and violence can be separated from what they are 
contrasted with, namely, ethics and justice 
 
Force or coercion are necessary components of law, its establishment as well as its 
subsequent enforceability, but they are also obvious threats to justice.  The establishment 
of a system of justice itself presupposes a moment of violence that could not have been 
sanctioned by arrangements agreed on by those over whom the violence is exercised. 
(McCormick 2001: 398) 
 
As McCormick points out, this analysis is made up of putting the purified foundations of law into 
question.  Just as Frank, in our earlier discussion, talked about the inconsistencies and illusions 
found within the body of law, Derrida and Vico unveil the fanciful delusion that law is founded in 
justice.  McCormick rightly describes this type of analysis as a “persistent provisionality and a 
continual prologue to enlightenment and the establishment of justice” (McCormick 2001: 399).  
We have called this type of meditation a hermeneutics of origins/beginnings.  Vico, like Derrida, 
operates through the provisionality of law’s logic and justifiability.  Justice exists within the body 
of a law built upon the foundation of violence; it exists as a ‘deconstruction’ of the presumptions of 
violence but never a denial or repression. 
 Derrida, through his reading of Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, distinguishes between 
two forms of violence.  Mythic violence is a product of the Greek tradition.  This type of violence 
will become the main feature of Vico’s analysis of legal development and, as a result, is important 
to my overall analysis.  This violence is one of chaos reduction and it does this “by establishing the 
political” (McCormick 2001: 405).  This is a violence that bifurcates into two subtypes: “the 
founding violence, the one that institutes and positions law…and the violence that conserves, the 
one that maintains, confirms, insures the permanence and enforceability of law” (Derrida 1992: 
31).  These distinctions can simply be phrased in terms of a law-making violence versus a law-
conserving violence.  Mythic violence relies on a re-telling and re-appropriation of its origins; in 
other words, it recalls its beginnings in blood.  This coercive feature binds members of a legal 
community together in fear.  Vico does not hide from the implications of this idea.  In fact, long 
before deconstruction, Vico’s thought is caught in the conundrum of originary violence and its 
relation to law.  Law is, essentially, a conversion of violence yet it retains the features of its 
primordial force.  Representative language, in the case of Benjamin, or, something that lies in the 
realm of writing, means that law is fallen and compromised.  This definitely fits into the Derridean 
schema of the privilege of speech over writing yet it also signifies a hostility to mythology as the 
basis of un-truth, deception, and, in the end, violence.  For Vico, however, violence is reduced 
through the representative capacities of language.  Myth reduces the natural inclination of humans 
towards force because it intercedes with metaphoric representation; Vico calls these essential 
features imitations of violence.  The Greek concept of mimesis plays a major role in the formation 
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of legal consciousness since it makes possible non-violence.  Albeit this is not a pure non-violence; 
it is one based on a historic compromise.  In theatrical terms, is a stage performance that mimics a 
murder or violent death something that reduces aggressive reaction from the audience, or, does it 
encourage such behavior?  Aristotle in his poetics argued that such theatrical scenes could provide 
the audience with a sufficient release from its inherently violent tendencies; it could remove bad 
emotions and replace them with positive ones.  This expunging was called catharsis and Vico 
thinks that such an imitative performance is at the heart of law’s founding and conserving power 
 
During that period of adolescence of mankind—which is the age when fantasy is 
powerful in human beings and, for that reason, was the poet’s century…the first founders 
of commonwealths transformed the right of the Greater Gentes in certain imitations of 
violence. (2000:92) 
 
 Derrida argues that Benjamin is seeking a “finality, a justice of ends that is no longer tied 
to the possibility of droit…” (Derrida 1992: 51).  It is the task of mystical or divine violence, which 
stands on the Judaic side of the contrast with mythic violence, to deny or negate the proclivities of 
Greek law.  That means that it must stand beyond universality and representation and appear in its 
simple and uncomplicated purity.  Benjamin speaks of this, as Derrida recounts, in positive 
theological terms 
 
To this violence of the Greek mythos, Benjamin opposes feature for feature the violence 
of God.  From all points of view, he says, it is its opposite.  Instead of founding droit, it 
destroys it; instead of setting limits and boundaries, it annihilates them; instead of leading 
to error and expiation, it causes to expiate; instead of threatening, it strikes; and above all, 
this is the essential point, instead of killing with blood, it kills and annihilates without 
bloodshed.  Blood makes all the difference. (Derrida 1992: 52) 
 
Blood is the symbol of life and God does not spill it out of His deep connection to this force.  Yet 
God does punish in and through violence; a violence that is somehow pure and un-touched because 
it source is un-known and un-precedented.  The general strike that develops into a larger 
proletarian attack on the state is the clearest example that Benjamin has in mind.  It is a violence 
that creates the purely new; it is, in other words, the eschatological-messianic hope of God’s 
intervention in history.  Revolutionary zeal combines with theological insight to create this vision.  
Something that Derrida argues is never too far from the core of Hegalianism or Marxism.  Derrida 
claims that these obsessions are founded in a deep concern over the status of the decision.  Here, 
once again, the distinctions drawn are his point of departure 
 
All undecidability…is situated, blocked in, accumulated on the side of droit, of 
mythological violence, that is to say the violence that founds and conserves droit.  But on 
the other hand all decidability stands on the side of divine violence that destroys le droit, 
we could even venture to say deconstructs it. (Derrida 1992: 54) 
 
Here the arch of theology coincides that of revolution.  The law of God is in favour of the violence 
that destroys a conserving-conservative power.  This conservative and founding violence is self-
destructive because it breeds counter-violences that it must engage with in polemos.  This 
decidability, however, is “a decision not accessible to man” (Derrida, 1992: 55).  Here we come to 
the conundrum or paradox at the heart of a revolutionary logic that relies on a reformed negative 
theology.  As Derrida rightfully points out, this decision is inaccessible and therefore beyond the 
pale of human knowledge 
 
It is never known in itself, “as such”, but only in its “effects” and its effects are 
“incomparable”, they do not lend themselves to any conceptual generalization.  There is 
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2008, 111-127 
 121  
no certainty or determinant knowledge except in the realm of mythic violence, that is, of 
droit, that is, of the undecidable we have been talking about. (Derrida 1992: 56) 
 
Derrida’s point is that the dichotomies laid out by revolutionary thought or theological speculation 
do not offer viable solutions.  The decision cannot lie only on one side of the difference because the 
undecidable inhabits the majority of the space between these two types.  In other words, we can 
only recognize and understand divine violence through our negative work in deconstructing mythic 
violence.  And most importantly, we can only understand the practical tasks of law through the 
certainty provided for by our various mythologies.  Vico clearly sees the nature of this problematic 
because he analyzes the certainty created by law.  His theology begins from human’s falleness and 
the artifice of coercive law is meant to return us to our spiritual source.  Vico’s providential-
eschatology sees this as the vindication of violence and authority through human striving; there is 
no pure violence but only the concrete struggle of epochs.  In the end, it is the spirit that drives 
humans to convert and overcome violence with the means available.  Instead of overturning all 
means for the sake of unknowable end(s), we must convert the symbolic implications brought out 
by history’s varied means and convert them towards providential ends.   
 This is part of a process that we will describe as a second-order observational reduction of 
violence.  This is self-observation that begins with myth, language, and representation and ends, as 
we will show, with conceptuality.  The nexus was originally a physical constraint used on the neck 
of the slave or client; it was eventually replaced with a “fictional knot” (2000:92).  Likewise, many 
other legal forms developed out of these fictions created through the aid of language and 
representation.  Of the legal tradition of usucapion, Vico says 
 
The usucapion no longer required the constant physical adhesion and the possession that 
was obtained, at the beginning, with a true physical act but was, thereafter, preserved 
only by the spirit’s intention…the obligation no longer needed chains for the body but 
imposed a certain ligament consisting in a formula of words (certo verborum ligamine). 
(2000: 92) 
 
These are all examples of how second-order observation or systems, like the law, observing 
themselves, can lead to linguistic devices that replace physical acts.  Many of these acts were 
initially the violent and aggressive acts of a strongman.  With the intercession of words, however, 
law is spiritualized; it is, in other words, brought to the brink of conceptuality both as a salvation 
and as a condemnation. 
 
The Autonomy of Law and the Emergence of Legal Conceptuality 
 
My purpose in this last section is to analyze how this process of second-order observation 
creates the very context in which Vico’s theory of law is to be understood.  Niklas Luhmann has 
artfully described this process as the ‘differentiation of the legal realm’ and the development of 
autonomy.  Luhmann draws out the implications of this process and links its conceptualization to 
the interpretive tasks of deconstruction.  As in deconstruction the foundation of the analysis must 
begin with the assumption of the aporia: “all knowledge and all action has to be founded on 
paradoxes and not on principles; on the self-referential unity of the positive and the negative—that 
is, on an ontologically unquantifiable world” (Luhmann 1993: 770).  The aporia or the im-passable 
is the “visible indicator of invisibility” because it hides the operations of its own creation 
(Luhmann 1993: 770).  The autonomy of the legal system means that its own self-observations 
become integral parts of its reproduction 
 
Autopoietic systems are the products of their own operations.  They have properties such 
as dynamic stability and operational closure.  They are not goal-oriented systems.  They 
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2008, 111-127 
 122  
maintain their autopoietic organization of self-reproduction as long as it is possible to do 
so.  Their problem is to find operations that can be connected to the present state of the 
system…They use self-referential operations to refer to their present state to decide what 
to do next. (Luhmann 1993: 771) 
 
Autopoiesis occurs through the differences that are continually drawn between system and 
environment.  In other words, “the identity of law is not given by any stable ideal but exclusively 
by those operations that produce and reproduce a specific legal meaning” (Luhmann 2004: 78).  
Law is bound in and through its distinctions.  Yet these distinctions must be made operative and 
understandable by the legal system itself; one cannot impose extra-legal categories to understand 
the social function of law because all outside references must be put into a language that is 
juridically coordinated.  Law stabilizes normative and cognitive expectations while employing the 
code of legal/illegal (Luhmann 2004: 147).  As a result, we can no longer meaningfully speak of 
the facticity or validity of law and can only rely on the reference to a legal system.  Therefore, we 
cannot begin with an ideal sense of law since this would take us beyond the appropriate context of 
the system; the law must, in turn, be grasped as a process that engenders the “certainty of 
expectations” (Luhmann 2004: 148).  This means that the law, in its function, will be observed as a 
system that “makes it possible to know which expectations will meet with social approval and 
which not” (Luhmann 2004: 148).  The law is practically and conceptually actualized through its 
code and its various programmes.  The code, as I mentioned earlier, is a simple reduction of 
complexity that can pose all questions in the binarism of legal/illegal.  Decisions can only be 
vindicated in this way since, as I have pointed out, there is no extra-legal reference for legal 
decidability.  This coding is not self-sufficient, according to Luhmann who uses a self-consciously 
Derridean phrase, because it is always in need of further supplements.  This occurs because: “there 
must be further points of view which indicate whether or not and how the values of the code are to 
be allocated rightly or wrongly.  We shall call these additional semantic elements (in law and in 
other coded systems) programmes.  Programmes allow for critical discussion and, therefore, 
contribute to the increase of second-order observation.  This distinction is intra-systemic and “the 
autopoietic self-determination of the system comes about only because of the difference between 
coding and programming” (Luhmann 2004: 193).  The programme essentially reduces the severity 
of the either/or found in the code and makes possible elaborate forms of self-referentiality.  But 
what is a programme?  First, Luhmann argues, programmes found in the legal system are always 
conditional which “provide reasons for the generation of difference (an amplification of deviation) 
on the condition that the effects produced can be secured through the differentiation of 
corresponding systems” (Luhmann 2004: 197).  The conditional programme spells out the 
conditions on which it depends, “whether something is legal or illegal.”  It is, most succinctly, a 
way for dealing with legal justification with an eye to the future; modo futuri exacti.  Juristic 
decisions, for example, are made “exclusively on the basis of what they see as the future at the 
moment of their decision, that is, on the basis of what appears to them…to be the present future” 
(Luhmann 2004: 200).  The conditional programme is, therefore, not bound to the strictures of 
tradition in an overly rigid way because the conditionality of its existence means that it changes 
when both judge and case are at hand.  Hard cases that raise the uncertainty of legal formulation 
must rely on conditional programmes because they have an eye to future expectations.  
Contingency, in a related sense, must also be dealt with by the system.  Here, for example, 
Luhmann can describe justice not as a transcendent value beyond the legal system but as a formula 
for contingency that must visibly speak of values while invisibly covering over this very 
contingency.  The law cannot, however, except justice as a natural condition of possibility but must 
find ways to operationalize it within a system context 
 
Justice as a formula for contingency in its most general form has traditionally, and still 
today, been identified with equality.  Equality is seen as a general, formal element, which 
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contains all concepts of justice but which means only something akin to regularity or 
consistency.  Equality is seen, and this applies to all formulae for contingency, as a 
‘principle’ which legitimizes itself…The formula for contingency is a scheme for the 
search for reasons or values, which can become legally valid only in the form of 
programmes.  Every answer to whatever issue is addressed would then have to be found 
in the legal system by mobilizing its recursivity. (Luhmann 2004: 217-18) 
 
The legal system progressively engenders its own forms of self-critique and value.  Justice is an 
unknowable point of view but equality can find certain formulae within the legal system.  As a 
result, some justice resides within the legal system through its own recursive values.  These values 
are, at first, justified through extra-legal reference to nature or God, as I showed in my analysis of 
Derrida, something which, in truth, can never be metaphysically surpassed.  However, they 
eventually come to reside in internal legal norms referred to as eigenvalues.  Luhmann describes 
the function of these eigenvalues as “recursively stabilized functional mechanisms, which remain 
stable even when their genesis and their mode of functioning have been revealed” (Luhmann 1996: 
1).  We will argue that these eigenvalues as self-referential and interior forms legal value can be 
read into Vico’s theory of law.  In fact, there is a stark similarity between Luhmann’s assumptions 
about how a system such as the law develops autonomy and comes to found formulae for 
contingency and Vico’s analysis of the movement from certum to verum.  In sum, it means that 
legal systems develop self-observational values that are often described as ‘principles’ but that 
have difficulty escaping their own contingency.  This is the paradox of ascertaining the meaning 
and standing of different legal moral-principles as they operate within the system.   
 We have described the nature of Luhmann’s systems theory and its relation to law to 
elucidate the structure of legal communication.  Communication, as we mentioned earlier, is a 
reflexive activity and form of knowledge production in which the point of reference has become 
internal.  By exploring the implications of systems theory as well as Derrida’s deconstruction, we 
have been able to emphasis this growing self-referentiality.  Vico’s theory of law is able to make 
significant and positive contributions towards a reflexive theory of law because of its ability to fold 
its own manifestations back on itself and to proceed historically.  In sum, Vico, in my 
interpretation, moves from a sense of law that is bound to a cosmic order as a self-evident reality of 
force and nature to a self-observation of law as law.  Law in its functions and meanings is linked to 
a self-observation, at the system level, of its own groundings.  That is why I have emphasized the 
aporias of foundation and violence at the heart of the historicity of law.  These self-referential 
questions and inquiries are by a prolonged and divergent tradition of judicial review.  Roman 
jurisprudence, as it is developed through the Edictum Perpetuum and juristic elaboration, becomes 
a fully articulated legal metaphysics on which is based a series of structural and communicative 
linkages.  Aequitas and iustitia; auctoritas and libertas; formal procedure and practical context; all 
become, in Luhmann’s terms, eigenvalues.  Vico, in the opinion of this study, is the first to 
conceive and lay out the consequences of a history of law based on differentiation; of its own 
second-order observation; and, as a result, of its own possibilities for deconstruction.  These 
eigenvalues are not eternal verities for Vico but historical conquests of a legal metaphysics.  As 
such, this metaphysics does not hold onto a truth that is necessary according to ideal premises but 
that speaks of the implications of the historical development of law.  It draws out the consequences 
of the paradoxes that law must live with.  This is the key to my argument and the source for the 
general relevance of Vico’s unique understanding of legal institutions.  He emerges from this 
analysis not as an antiquarian oddity but as an insightful commentator on the recursive nature of 
law; something that, as I have shown, is an extremely relevant question to modern legal theory. 
 The final piece of the puzzle comes in understanding how this second-order observation is 
constructed from within the history of law.  What are its dynamics?  Are there clear indicators of its 
features?  In general Vico’s work operates with a constant self-referentiality but we can examine 
the specifics of legal development through the key terms of certum and verum.  Certum must be 
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understood as what is ‘made in law’.  In modern terms, one could draw connections with the 
positive theory of law.  It is expressed as a “conscience secure from doubting”; in other words, it 
makes reality through the human mind (2000:11).  The certum is unable to pierce the true nature of 
reality and therefore must rely on such things as probability or versimilarity.  One can observe 
connections to the mythico-poetic foundations that I spoke of earlier.  However, the certum is not 
fanciful; it constructs real human relations.  These relations, as well as the knowledge that emerges 
as a result, become ossified through repetition and become what many might call custom or 
tradition.  Law based on custom operates on the basis of the certum; things are made certain, 
dependable or predictable.  Here both our senses and the massed opinion of others culminate to 
create legal tradition (2000:11).  This tradition is not an arbitrary collection of maxims and rules 
imposed from a distant elite but something that ties into the context of people’s lives through the 
art of persuasion.  The contingency of this legal development is emphasized by Vico as one side of 
the relation between certum and verum.  The certum is grounded in authority.  The ‘correctness’ of 
traditional interpretation is what is being emphasized here.  Correctness emerges not from a firm 
grasp of ultimate reality but from the expulsion of doubt in quasi-Cartesian move.  Authority is the 
expulsion of doubt because it expunges questioning and takes for granted certain social verities.  In 
other words, legal communication is recursively structured in and through the order that abides in a 
particular society.  As I showed through the mythic origins of law, this means that law begins 
through an act of persuasive contingency that becomes authoritative through the recursive 
construction of structures that are veiled.  In other words, law is socially self-created but does not 
appear so.  Religion, myth, and poetry cover over this illusion of legal certainty yet Vico is able to 
show us its roots.  One can clearly see this Vichian interpretation at work when he discusses the 
origin and significance of legal formulae: 
 
When the Optimates became the best only by name without the reality of the thing, then 
the civil order succeeded to the natural order and the verum succeeded the certum that is 
the conformation to the order not of things but of words, from which the conscience safe 
from publicly doubting proceeds (conscientia publice dubitandi secura). (2000: 125)  
 
And so, legal history develops along the lines of the self-production of legal certainty.  Nature and 
civil order come together in a self-creation initiated by language.  Formulae contain words and 
gestures of archaic origin but they are also very succinct in expressing mimetic forms of violence 
and rendering social cohesion more likely.  The certum, in sum, is the very constitution of the civil 
(2000:125).  As a result, one can read the poems of Homer and Virgil as legal texts and draw a line 
from there to the beginnings of pragmatic forms of law.  The certum binds the law to its extra-legal 
origins through the continuity of authority; mythico-poetic traditions spill into the serious poem of 
the law through the desire to reduce doubt about the cosmic-existential. 
 On the other side of the Vichian dichotomy stands the verum.  However, as soon as one 
examines the contexts of use for this word one notices the tenacious deconstruction of the whole 
idea of standing, irredeemable binaries.  Vico rarely mentions one side of the binary without 
immediately bringing in its relation to the other side; one presupposes the other; and one side 
cannot be understood without the context of the other.  I believe this nascent deconstructive logic is 
particularly apparent when Vico discusses the verum.  The verum is most simply defined as the 
“proper and perpetual attribute of necessary right” (2000:63).  It has a sense of constancy that is 
always somehow present within the body of law.  The verum is not something that can be grasped 
outside the context of a culture that is able to abstract ideas out of history; reason, for Vico, enters 
history as the ability to observe the self-production of law and society.  As a result of reflexive 
reflection, brought about largely through the emergence of philosophy and its growing influence on 
jurisprudence, Vico is able to identify reason within the process of legal formation.  This reflexive 
reflection is what allows us, according to Vico, to step out of the taken-for-granted assumptions of 
tradition and dominant opinion by making the invisible visible.  This self-observational premise 
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and, I would say, the formula through which one can grasp Vico’s theory of law is expressed 
through the simple dictum of Certum est pars veri—the certain is part of the truth (2000: 62).  Here 
the intertwining of binaries gives life and movement to the law.  Instead of conceiving these 
binaries as self-sufficient they repeatedly bleed into each other; they never remain completely 
isolated on their own side of the breach.  In Chapter 83 of Universal Right entitled ‘The Certain is 
From Authority, the True from Reason’ Vico says: “the certum, the certain, is from authority, as 
verum, the true, is from reason, and that authority cannot completely oppose reason because 
otherwise there would be no laws, but monsters of law (monstra legume)” (2000: 62).  Authority is, 
therefore, pars rationis, part of reason.  All of these ideas culminate in the self-observational notion 
that the Roman law, as Vico’s case in point, is imbued with notions that work from both sides, as 
well as in-between, these two bedrocks of interpretation.  How does this occur?  Vico answers this 
question by tying the certum and the verum to the actions, thoughts, and interests of particular 
groups: “Those who hold fast on certum, the certain of the laws, are the pragmatics of law, whilst 
those who hold fast on verum, the true of the laws, are philosophers of the law” (2000: 64).  
However, Vico is not comfortable with a hard and fast distinction here either because if one 
examines legal history one sees the intertwining of philosophical and pragmatic perspectives.  One 
can see it in the seemingly philosophical influences of Stoicism and the Academy on the Roman 
jurists.  Concepts such as aequitas invoke abstract forms of universalism brought to fruition not 
through an imposition of philosophy on legal training but through a self-constructed movement 
towards greater conceptual universality.  Therefore, one can look at the history of Roman law and 
see the verum of aequitas, as a properly philosophical concept, at work in the long time of the 
certum.  Further, one can see the influence of legal ideas all the way from the earliest notions of 
dike in pre-Socratic philosophy to the centrality of law in Plato, Aristotle, and others.  All 
philosophers seem to have been taken with the idea that a society must rely on the rule of law to 
create harmony.  Legal metaphors were also widely used to talk of the governance of the soul and 
self-mastery.  Vico, in the end, is able to mediate im-passable paradoxes not by eliminating or 
resolving but by involving them in inescapable co-implication.  All of this is a result of growing 
second-order observation being, in itself, observed. 
 In conclusion, the question will be asked: ‘Does such a typology of law, in all its 
paradoxicality, produce the contours of an ethical account of law?’  If one is looking for a clear and 
demarcated ethical delineation of law’s meaning, one will come up, once again, against the walls of 
self-referential paradox that ties divergent values together 
 
All the virtues are one virtue, and each one of the three is always together with the other 
two; the two-fold particular justice, directing and equalizing, is one universal justice, and 
each of them is always accompanied by the other two; virtue and justice are one, one is 
the power of truth, and one is the human reason; thus, dominion, liberty, and tutelage, so 
far as they are conforming with upright reason, are invested with this same character of 
divine origin. (2000: 65) 
 
The values embodied in law are self-producing paradoxes of indexicality; they each refer to the one 
another and from a collection of interest and accommodation that binds dominion, liberty, and 
tutelage into a hermeneutic circle 
 
All three from a unity, and each one of them is always connected with the other two: in 
the dominion, liberty and tutelage are contained; in the liberty, dominion and tutelage; in 
tutelage, dominion and liberty.  Therefore, the person who is the owner, is also the 
moderator and the arbiter of its own property; this person may, whenever wishing, protect 
its property against injury and violence.  The human being who is free, is owner of at 
least its own freedom and, by right, may defend it from violence and injury, whenever so 
wishing.  The human being who, by right, defends its possessions and “way of being”, 
should be free and master (Qui rem iure tuetur, liber et dominus sit oportet). (2000:65)  
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The power of defense and the will to carry it through are co-implicated with the freedom and right 
to do so.  Natural freedom is of the type described above and is bound to solitary forms of strength 
that make a space for human habitation.  Civil freedom is made, via reason, the self-observational 
grasping of this verity and culminates in the idea of aequitas.  In sum, by following the history of 
authority, as made by the certum, I will illuminate the work of freedom as it comes to fruition in 
certain eigenvalues.  In order to do so, I will focus on the self-productive as well as self-
observational capacities of the law to produce values that show their own creation.  Freedom, as 
one of my major examples, can only be grasped as a reflexive self-mastery and attunement to 
power.  This revelation does not, however, reduce the internal veracity of these values because it 
consistently argues that they can only be understood within the autonomy of a developing legal 
system.  The understanding of the legal system can only be revealed through continuous and 
recursive analyses of the way communication occurs.  Communication is the avenue through which 
paradoxicality is tamed and used for constructive purposes.  In order to grasp the essence of this 
idea of communication one must rigorously examine the self-mastery of complexity and 
contingency.  To place Vico within the context of this understanding of law is to do justice to his 
brilliant and provocative insights.  Further, I believe that his manner and method can bring new 
insight to the aporias of contemporary legal debate which has not adequately encountered the issue 
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